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1.0 Executive Summary
The virus that causes Abalone Viral Ganglioneuritis (AVG) is considered to be exotic to Western 
Australia (WA). The known distribution includes Victoria, Tasmania and Taiwan. There are a 
number of known strains of the virus; Tasmanian strains do not (to date) cause mortalities in 
wild abalone (but do so in farms and processing facilities). Victorian and Taiwanese strains 
cause high mortalities in wild abalone. Despite active surveillance, the virus has not been found 
in NSW, South Australia or Western Australia but there is a low likelihood that WA specific 
strains may exist undetected. 
The risk posed by AVG virus occurring in juveniles sourced from hatcheries in WA and 
translocated to the open ocean in southern Western Australia either for stock enhancement (re-
seeding) or for marine grow-out (sea-ranching) purposes has been assessed using standard risk 
assessment methodology with the outputs having been independently reviewed. 
While the likelihoods of the AVG virus occurring in the hatchery range from “negligible to “low” 
should no additional management measures be applied, the consequences of detection (including 
biological, economic and environmental) are generally “High” and in two cases the resultant 
risks were “unacceptable” with just the current legal management requirements. Given that the 
initial risks associated with oceanic deployment of abalone were assessed as Moderate to High, 
additional formal management intervention is required to reduce these to acceptable levels.
The primary concern is that the virus could become established in a hatchery facility and then 
be more likely to infect wild stock through the release of hatchery released juveniles into the 
oceanic waters. The likelihood of this outcome occurring has been assessed as very low if 
the suggested hatchery management measures that could be applied to mitigate the risk to an 
acceptable level are adopted. Protocols are in place to ensure that any emergence of AVG in 
a hatchery would be detected. If the virus was ever detected in the hatchery the water supply 
should be immediately shut down. This can be done using existing legislation (FRMA r177(2) 
so there is no legislative impediment to limiting effects of a disease outbreak in a hatchery). 
The placement of grow out structures and juvenile releases could also be planned in a manner 
to both minimise the likelihood of transmission to wild stocks and limit the spread of any 
infection. 
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2.0 Background
Abalone viral ganglioneuritis was first identified on abalone farms in Victoria in 2005 and 
subsequently spread to the wild abalone fishery where it caused substantial mortalities. 
Subsequently, there were outbreaks of AVG in Tasmanian live-holding processing facilities 
in 2008 and 2009. In December 2010 there was a further outbreak of AVG disease in 
Tasmanian abalone. The disease was initially detected in abalone processors facilities 
and subsequently spread through untreated discharge to the marine environment and to 
a local abalone farm, resulting in the compulsory destruction and decontamination of all 
of the affected facilities. As a result, some members of the wildstock fishery in WA have 
raised concerns over the risk of AVG disease in Western Australia relative to the current 
and proposed projects that involve releasing hatchery-reared abalone back into the wild. 
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3.0 Methodology Adopted In This Report
Risk Assessment was undertaken using the approach outlined in Jones & Stephens (2006) and 
in Diggles (2011). This methodology is consistent with the Australian Standard AS/NZS ISO 
31000:2009. A risk assessment requires several steps:
 y Establish the ‘scope’ or context;
 y Hazard identification or ‘risk identification’ (what can go wrong);
 y Risk analysis and ‘risk evaluation’ (how likely is it to go wrong?);
 y Risk management (what can we do about it?);
 y Monitor and regularly review the effectiveness of all steps in the process.
3.1  The Scope
The scope is to assess the risk posed by AVG in the translocation of juveniles sourced from any 
Abalone hatchery in WA to the open ocean.
3.2  Hazard identification 
Hazard identification was accomplished using “Failure Mode Analysis”. Failure Mode Analysis 
is an engineering technique used to identify critical steps that lead to systems failure (in this case, 
an outbreak of AVG among wild abalone on the South Coast caused by the abalone hatchery). 
The diagrams of the pathways identified for “failure” to occur are shown in Figure 1. 
Figure 1.  Compendium map of potential pathways leading to an AVG outbreak originating from farm 
activities in Western Australia. “Avoid testing” refers to a possible pathway by which animals 
are released without health checks.
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3.3  Assessment of Risk 
The assessment of risk can be undertaken in a quantitative manner, in which the likelihood 
and consequences are expressed in mathematical terms and the risk is expressed in terms such 
as “one event in 100 years”. This approach presents particular challenges (Murray 2002) and 
usually involves Monte Carlo simulation modelling (Vose 2000). This approach was used 
in estimating the risk of abalone escaping from an abalone farm (Hawkins & Jones 2002). 
An alternative approach, particularly where information is scarce, or time is short, is to use a 
qualitative or semi-quantitative method where likelihood and consequences are expressed in 
terms such as “high”, “medium” or “low”. This approach was used in the Tasmanian abalone 
industry risk assessment (Anon. 2007) and is the one that was used in this report.
Likelihood estimation. Likelihood is a general description of probability or frequency. For the 
purposes of this project, ‘likelihood’ has been described according to the likelihood table (Table 1). 
Table 1. Nomenclature for the qualitative likelihood estimations used in this RA (modified from 
Diggles 2011).
Likelihood (score) Definition
High (6) The event would be very likely to occur (>55%)
Moderate (5) The event would occur with an even probability
Low (4) The event would be unlikely to occur (20-45%)
Very Low (3) The event would be very unlikely to occur (1-19%)
Extremely low (2) The event would be extremely unlikely to occur (0.9-0.1%)
Negligible (1) The event would almost certainly not occur (<0. 1%)
Consequences assessment. These are the outcomes, or impact of a given event. In a disease 
based risk assessment it is usual to have a range of four or five consequences ranging from 
negligible to severe (Jones & Stephens 2006, Diggles 2011). The general consequence table and 
levels used in this assessment are shown in Table 2.
The overall level of risk is usually calculated as the mathematical product of the likelihood and 
consequence levels (Risk = Likelihood x Consequence) and is called the ‘risk value’. These 
values are usually displayed as a ‘risk matrix table’ (Table 3). From the ‘risk value’ each issue 
can be assigned a ‘risk ranking’ depending upon where a risk value falls within one of a number 
of predetermined categories or criteria (Table 4). 
Though the method is based on an arithmetic scale for ease of calculation, the nature of 
‘consequences’, in particular, is not linear. The risk values in Table 3 have been separated into 
three risk ranking categories. Risk ranking categories may be more or less than three, but three 
is a commonly used number (HB 436: 2004). 
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Table 2. The General Consequence Levels for Assessment of Disease Impacts 
Level Descriptor
Low (1) Establishment of the disease has mild biological consequence and would be 
amenable to control or eradication and/or;
May harm economic performance at an enterprise level but be of limited 
significance at an industry level and/or;
Effect on environment would be minor or temporary.
Moderate (2) Establishment of the disease has moderate biological consequences and 
disease may be amenable to control or eradication, at a significant cost and/or;
May harm economic performance at an industry level and/or;
May affect the environment, but not seriously and may be reversible.
High (3) Establishment of the disease would have serious biological consequences 
(high mortality or morbidity etc) with effects that would be felt for a prolonged 
period and would difficult to control or eradicate and/or;
Will significantly harm economic performance at an industry level or regional 
level and may cause serious harm to the environment.
Catastrophic (4) Establishment of the disease would significantly harm economic performance 
at a national level and/or;
May cause long-term or irreversible harm to the environment.
Table 3. Risk Matrix – numbers in cells indicate Risk Value, the colours/shades indicate Risk 
Rankings (see Table 4 for details)
Likelihood Low Moderate High Catastrophic
1 2 3 4
Negligible 1 1 2 3 4
Extremely Low 2 2 4 6 8
Very Low 3 3 6 9 12
Low 4 4 8 12 16
Moderate 5 5 10 15 20
High 6 6 12 18 24
 
Table 4.  Risk Rankings and Outcomes
Risk Rankings Risk Values Likely Management Response
Negligible, 
Acceptable




6 – 10 Risks are acceptable provided Risk Reduction measures are 
implemented to reduce risk to acceptable level.
Extreme, 
Unacceptable
11 – 24 Risk is unacceptable. Risk management measures will be 
required to achieve “acceptable risk”, or it may not be possible 
to meet the “acceptable risk” at all.
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Acceptable risk. The acceptability of risk in a particular circumstance is perceived differently by 
different individuals and organizations including governments. Governments accept taking risks 
because of the net community benefits (which may be environmental, social or financial) that are 
expected to accrue from their risk-taking behaviour. The amount of risk they will tolerate (i.e. 
the ‘expected loss’ if things go wrong) is known by a variety of terms including ‘acceptable level 
of risk’ (SPS Agreement), ‘tolerable risk’ (HB 436: 2004) or the ‘appropriate level of protection 
(ALOP)’ (Biosecurity Australia). 
3.4  Risk management 
This involves the process of identifying, evaluating and monitoring measures that can be taken 
to ensure that the risk is reduced to a level consistent with the acceptable level of risk. This can 
be done either by reducing the probability of the event occurring (preventative measures), or 
by reducing the consequences should the event occur (mitigation measures). The measures that 
are implemented must be the minimum required to achieve the acceptable level of risk and are 
not to be used as a disguised restriction on trade. They must also be “transparent” i.e. readily 
available to interested parties and the scientific justification provided as required. 
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4.0 What We Know About AVG? 
Abalone Viral Ganglioneuritis is caused by highly virulent herpes-like-virus (AbHV-1) that 
affects the nervous tissue of abalone causing rapid mortality (Hooper et al. 2007, Savin et al. 
2010). The species known to be susceptible to AbHV-1 in Australia are the greenlip abalone 
(Haliotis laevigata), blacklip abalone (H. rubra) and hybrids of these two species (Hooper et 
al. 2007). Clinical signs consistent with AVG have not been reported in other molluscan species 
in areas where AbHV-1 is suspected to be enzootic. 
The AbHV-1 virus spreads through direct contact, through the water column without contact and 
it can also be spread to healthy abalone by offal, mucus, shells, contaminated fishing equipment 
or people who have been handling abalone (Crane et al. 2009). The mucus from infected abalone 
is thought to be the main pathway through which the disease can spread. 
The AbHV-1 virus first appeared in abalone farms in southern Victoria in late 2005, and 
subsequently spread to the wild abalone fishery along 280 km of coastline at a rate of 5 to 10 
km/month (Hills 2007), causing a reduction of total allowable catch (TAC) in the fishery from 
280 tonnes to 16 tonnes (Mayfield et al. 2011). Outbreaks of AVG in both farmed and wild 
abalone populations in Victoria were associated with high mortality rates (up to 90%) in all age 
classes (Hooper et al. 2009). Subsequent outbreaks of AVG occurred in Tasmanian processing 
facilities in 2008, in 2009 and again during December 2010 and January 2011. On the latter 
occasion an abalone farm neighbouring one of the processors at Bicheno was also infected, with 
high mortalities (DPIPWE situation report Feb 2011). The wild fishery abalone at Bicheno also 
tested positive for the virus after the outbreak, but without mortalities (ABC News 21/1/2011). 
Sampling of sites identified by trace-back from the affected processor in 2008 resulted in one 
wild abalone from the southern D’Entrecasteaux Channel returning a weak PCR positive for 
AbHV-1. (DPIW situation report dated 21 Oct 2008). Surveys have shown that AbHV-1 occurs 
naturally at very low prevalences (3 out of 1625 abalone = 0.18% prevalence) in subclinical 
infections of wild populations of abalone in Tasmania (Corbeil et al. 2010). The virus also 
occurs in the coastal waters of western Victoria at moderate prevalences (Crane et al. 2009, 
Corbeil et al. 2010). 
Diagnostic testing: The ORF-49 TaqMan PCR test for AbHV-1 developed by Australian 
Animal Health Laboratory was validated using abalone from both the Victorian and the initial 
Tasmanian disease outbreaks (Corbeil et al. 2010). However, during 2009 it was found that 
clinically affected abalone did not provide positive results using the ORF-49 TaqMan PCR test 
and alternative TaqMan tests (ORF-66 and ORF-77) were required to confirm the presence of 
AbHV-1. This development led to the conclusion that there were probably a number of strains 
of the virus present in Tasmania, and not all would react consistently with a given TaqMan PCR 
test. At the present time the Victorian strain and each of the three known Tasmanian strains are 
considered distinct variations of the same virus. (Corbeil 2011, Mark Crane pers. com.).
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5.0 The Assessment
5.1  Hazard identification
The diagram of pathways identified through which a “failure” – AbHV-1 in the environment 
resulting in risk of an AVG outbreak either by the abalone farming operations or by the 
enhancement proposal, are shown in Figure 1. Using the pathways identified in this figure a 
table of Consequence and Likelihoods has been constructed (See Table 5). 
The assessments of risk presented in Table 1 separates those associated with the current 
aquaculture operations from those potentially additional risks associated with the proposed 
stock enhancement of juvenile abalone sourced from the aquaculture facility.
Summarising from Table 1 the following issues require consideration of risk reduction measures:
5.2  Issues for which Consideration of Additional Treatments 
is Required 
 y ISSUE 5 ABHV-1 in broodstock generated from importing interstate broodstock. 
(Risk Score of 6)
 y ISSUE 6 ABHV-1 carried into hatchery on incoming equipment and people from interstate 
(Risk Score of 9)
 y ISSUE 8 ABHV-1 in farm effluent (Risk score 9)
5.3  Issues Requiring Additional Treatments to Be Acceptable
The following issues with the currently levels of controls in place represented unacceptable risk, 
requiring risk management:
 y Issue 3 AbHV-1 is already present but undetected in WA wild abalone and a mutation or 
environmental event (possibly due to culturing system increases it’s virulence) affects 
broodstock. (Risk score 12 in absence of any additional mitigation controls outlined below)
 y Issue 9 ABHV-1 is in F1 generation abalone in hatchery or farm but undetected due to no 
testing being done or the test does not work on the strain. These infected individuals are 
put out into the ocean infecting the local wild stock with a virulent strain (Risk score 12 in 
absence of any additional mitigation controls outlined below)
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6.0 Possible Management Measures to Mitigate the Risk
The detailed set of potential risk mitigation measures that could be implemented to reduce the 
risks associated with the abalone aquaculture facility and abalone re-seeding or sea ranching 
are presented in Table 6.
Summarising from Table 6 the following mitigation measures have been identified which cover 
operations of the hatchery, deployment of juveniles into the ocean and recommendations for 
management.
6.1  Hatchery
The Hatchery should review its current Biosecurity Plan to ensure that it is comprehensive and 
that staff are suitably trained. Attention must be given to:
 o Routine decontamination of personnel at all entry points
 o Routine decontamination of all incoming equipment 
 o Independent audit of the Biosecurity Plan 
 o Routine testing of broodstock and other selected animals from the hatchery and adjacent 
farm (underway)
 o Maintenance of broodstock in tanks spatially separated from all other abalone, all 
equipment used with broodstock not to be used elsewhere, and effluent water from 
broodstock tanks must not be reused or discharged to the sea.
 y Use of effluent pond to dilute outflow.
 y Positioning of outlet pipes away from wild abalone fishery areas
 y Use of abalone feed that is free of abalone products
6.2  Marine Growout and Enhancement Protocols
The areas used to place the artificial structures for the marine grow-out of hatchery reared abalone 
would best be located on sandy substrates without direct contact to reefs, preferably away from 
reefs where significant level of harvesting of wild capture stocks of abalone is undertaken.
 y The trials of enhancement should be completed on reefs which are spatially separated from 
the remainder of the fishery. 
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6.3  Management
In considering ongoing management, the following is recommended:
 y Adopt as formal policy the 5 nm separation of aquaculture/processing facilities
 y Ensure regular compliance visits, inspecting farm records 
 y Ensure vigilant compliance to prevent uncontrolled interstate and intrastate movements of 
wild abalone
 y Adopt as formal policy the compulsory shut down of water supply on detection 
 y Adopt as formal policy the compulsory cessation of reseeding activity and traceback if AbHV-
1 detected in abalone (either broodstock or F1 juveniles) from the hatchery or elsewhere in 
WA. (application of Fisheries Resource Management Regulation 177(2)) 
 y Use the 99% confidence level when setting sample sizes for translocation. This was agreed 
by the Department in 19991 .
 y Maintain the present close linkages with the OIE reference laboratory on AVG (AAHL 
Geelong)
 y Continue to use histology as well as qPCR for routine health testing
1 The level of disease testing for imported abalone has been set at 99% confidence (Application to translocate aquatic organism. 
Statement of decision dated 22 June 1999). However, the disease testing and certification procedures used are based on probability 
theory - typically the probability of detecting a disease in 99% of the animals tested. Examining 300 animals gives a 99% assurance 
that a disease of at least 2% prevalence in the test population would be detected, assuming the method was completely accurate and 
no mistakes were made.
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7.0 Independent Review
This risk assessment has been reviewed by Dr Ben Diggles of DigsFish Services Pty Ltd. 
http://www.digsfish.com/2 . 
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Table 5.  Risk Table for assessing the risk of developing AbHV in wild stock abalone associated with 
the current aquaculture production of abalone and the potential re-seeding of abalone 


















Trials and Sea 
ranching
DISEASE PROBLEMS BEGIN IN WILD STOCK
1. AbHV-1 Is 
already present 
but undetected in 
WA wild abalone 
and it is found 
by increased or 
improved testing.
The presence of AbHV-1 
in Victorian and Tasmanian 
waters was not known until 
outbreaks occurred in live 
holding processing facilities. 
For Tasmania the virus was 
endemic, but the situation 
and origin of the disease in 








Farm blamed but 
not affected.
There is a Low likelihood that 
AbHV-1 may already exist 
in the wild in WA and is not 
currently causing significant 
disease issues.
Abalone farms have been 
operating in Bremer Bay for 
a number of years without 
AbHV-1 being detected, and 
testing of abalone in WA 
using PCR specific for the 
known strains of AbHV-1 and 
histology, which picks up the 
nerve changes caused by all 
known strains of this virus, 
have all been negative. 
If a strain of AbHV-1 is already 
here that is not causing 
problems, the impact on the 
wild fishery may not change. 
Thus the consequences are 
assessed as low
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Trials and Sea 
ranching
2. AbHV-1 Is 
already present 
but undetected in 
WA wild abalone 
and a mutation 
or environmental 
event occurs that 
increases it’s 
virulence.
Given that there is no defined 
cause for the initial outbreak 
in Victoria or Tasmania, it is 
possible that this was due to 
a change in the nature of an 










Farm blamed but 
not affected.
In Victoria the virus caused 
mass mortality in the wild. 
However, In Tasmania it 
has always been a disease 
in processing live holding 
facilities until this last 
December when it spread 
from a processor to the wild, 
then into an adjacent farm 
(150metres away) where it 
did cause mortalities. Though 
detected in the wild, it did not 
cause any wild mortalities, 
just the farm.
Given the absence of any 
evidence of current endemic 
infections, here in WA, the 
potential consequence if this 
arose naturally in the wild 
could be MODERATE 
The likelihood of this level 
of consequence actually 
happening based on this 
scenario is extremely low.
DISEASE PROBLEMS BEGIN IN FARMS
3. AbHV-1 Is 
already present 
but undetected in 
WA wild abalone 
and a mutation 
or environmental 






It is possible that the 
change in virulence could be 




RISK HIGH Consequence - 
HIGH
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Trials and Sea 
ranching
Two farms have operated on 
the site (now amalgamated) 
since 1999 without any 








Since 1999 over 1000 
abalone have been examined, 




If this did happen the potential 





Given that this has not 
occurred in the past 10 years, 





4. AbHV-1 enters 
by farm inlet 
water or other 
invertebrate 
vectors near inlet.
For this to occur, the AVG 
virus must already be in wild 
abalone in vicinity of the 
hatchery and if it is virulent 
it would have already been 








Unlike the Tasmanian 
experience, there are no live 
holding processors or other 
farms or hatcheries in the 





The likelihood of ABHV-1 that 
are endemic to WA being in 
the water supply appears to 
be Extremely Low, based on 
no detection since 1999 but 
the potential consequences 
of ABHV-1 in the inlet water 
could be a problem for the 
farm because once in the 
inlet water, deaths in the 
farm would occur (based 
on the Tasmanian and 
Victorian experience). But the 
consequence would not be 
that high for the wild stock 
if there is no evidence of 
mortalities beforehand.
Fisheries Research Report [Western Australia] No. 227, 2012 15


















Trials and Sea 
ranching






Only abalone broodstock 
from the area where release 
will occur are allowed. The 
potential consequences 










Interstate importation of live 
abalone is prohibited and 
there are only disincentives 
for local industry to use 
imported broodstock.
Given the current protocols 
the Likelihood of this outcome 
occurring is Extremely Low






The hatchery and the farm 
would face major losses and 
threaten health of wild stock 
if ABHV-1 occurs, hence the 






The hatchery has already 
identified this as a biosecurity 
issue in their Biosecurity Plan 
and has measures in place 
to prevent it occurring. In 
addition, the long distances 
between Victoria and WA 
ensure that equipment is 
unlikely to arrive in a dirty wet 
condition 
NOTE - The likelihood of this 
outcome occurring is initially 
rated as Very Low but with the 
industry protocols in place the 







not on current 
practices 
which would 





There is a negligible 
possibility that the disease 
could be introduced via 
contaminated feed. Abalone 
products are not used in the 
processed feed used in the 
hatchery. In the wild, the 
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Trials and Sea 
ranching
8. ABHV-1 in 
farm effluent
For this to occur there 
would need to already be an 





The Hatchery does not 
discharge into the sea. The 
consequences depend on 
the flow rates, flow duration 
and farm being near suitable 




9. ABHV-1 is in 
F1 generation 
abalone in 
hatchery or farm 
but undetected 
due to no 
testing being 
done or the test 
does not work 
on the strain. 
These infected 
individuals are 
put out into the 
ocean infecting 
the local wild 
stock with a 
virulent strain
For this to occur, the F1 
generation from the hatchery 
would have had to have 
contracted the ABHV-1 from 
the inlet water (Likelihood is 
Extremely Low), contaminated 
equipment (Likelihood is 
Extremely Low with controls) 
or be generated from infected 
locally sourced broodstock 
(Likelihood Low) which have 
gone undetected (Likelihood 
is Extremely Low with 
additional controls).  








The rationale for the 
likelihoods associated with 
each of these events are 






To affect the wildstock these 
infected individuals must also 
have not been tested prior 
to seeding or the test used 
was not effective for detecting 
the strain. The Likelihood of 
this occurring is Low given 
that the current PCR tests 
have not always picked up 
all strains, but the testing of 
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Trials and Sea 
ranching
Plus there must have been 
no evidence of problems 
in the rest in the rest of the 
farm broodstock, or other 
growout individuals, or these 
problems were ignored. Given 
the rapid impacts in the farms 
in Tasmania and Victoria the 
Likelihood of this is VERy 
LOW.
Consequently, the overall 
Likelihood of having infected 
animals being reseeded and 
impacting the wildstock if 
no additional controls are in 
place is LOW.
If additional controls for 
testing and isolating animals 
to be reseeded are instigated, 
the Likelihood would be 
reduced to VERy LOW of 
the farm broodstock, or other 
growout individuals, or these 
problems were ignored. Given 
the rapid impacts in the farms 
in Tasmania and Victoria the 
Likelihood of this is VERy 
LOW.
Consequently, the overall 
Likelihood of having infected 
animals being reseeded and 
impacting the wildstock if 
no additional controls are in 
place is LOW.
If additional controls for 
testing and isolating animals 
to be reseeded are instigated, 
the Likelihood would be 
reduced to VERy LOW.
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Table 6.  Possible Mitigation Measures









1 detected in 
broodstock





abalone used for 
reseeding 
Screening of all broodstock, 
biosecurity protocols that 
require holding broodstock 
completely separate to other 
abalone in the hatchery or 
on farm, including no reuse 
of broodstock effluent water
Comprehensive Biosecurity 
Plan and trained staff
Compulsory cessation 
of reseeding activity 
and traceback if AbHV-1 
detected in any abalone 






Low to Very 
Low
Risk Score now 
= 8 (Moderate),
Issue #9. ABHV-
1 detected in 
F1 generation 
of abalone in 
hatchery or farm
12 Threat that 
infected abalone 
in hatchery and 
those used for 
reseeding could 
infect wild abalone
Routine testing of selected 
animals from the hatchery 
and the farm 
Compulsory cessation 
of reseeding activity 
and traceback if AbHV-1 







from Low to 
Very Low
Risk Score = 8 
(Moderate)
Issue #9 (part) 
ABHV-1 infects 
the F1 which is 
not detected or 
before these are 
deployed
12 Ensure that the abalone 
juveniles released for 
grow out are spatially 
separated from significant 
local densities of wild stock 
by situating the grow-out 
structures on sand away 
from reefs.
For enhancement purposes, 
use sections of reefs that 
are spatially separated from 
the rest of the population
These would both further 
reduce likelihood of infection 
passing to wild stock
This separation should also 
reduce the consequence 
level to Moderate or Low if 
infection did occur because 






Risk Score = 6 
(Moderate)
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Issue Risk score Nature of unacceptable 
risk
Possible Risk Management 
Measures
Issue # 4 
ABHV-1 in farm/
hatchery inlet 
water or other 
invertebrate 
vectors
4 Threat to abalone 
populations on farm
Testing of abalone and other gastropod 
populations adjacent to farm inlet
Issue #5. ABHV-
1 in broodstock 
abalone from 
interstate.
6 Threat that infected 
abalone could be bought 
into the facility and used 
as broodstock, resulting 
in threat to abalone 
populations in hatchery
Screening of broodstock, testing of 
abalone before they leave broodstock 
area,
Biosecurity protocols that require 
holding broodstock completely 
separate to other abalone, including 
disposal of broodstock effluent water
Comprehensive Biosecurity Plan and 
trained staff 








9 This is a risk that is 
recognised in the Farm 
Biosecurity Plan and 
management controls are 
in place to ensure that it 
doesn’t happen. However, 
the consequences of 
an outbreak of AVG in 
the farm are severe 
both in terms of control 
measures (destocking 
and decontamination) and 
in public relations. 
Routine decontamination of incoming 
equipment
Independent audit of the Biosecurity 
Plan
Regular compliance visits
Routine testing of selected animals 




hatchery by staff 
but not reported 
to Department
6 Reporting unexplained 
mortalities is a 
requirement under the 
regulations. However, 
this scenario actually 
happened in a processing 
plant in Tasmania so 
the likelihood has been 
assessed as extremely 
low but not negligible. 
The consequences, for 
everyone involved, are 
very high
Regular compliance visits, inspecting 
farm records
Independent audit?
Comprehensive Biosecurity Plan and 
trained staff
Routine testing of selected animals 
from the farm
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Issue Risk score Nature of unacceptable 
risk
Possible Risk Management 
Measures
Issue #8 (part). 
ABHV-1 in farm 
effluent
9 The presence of ABHV-1 
in farm effluent (however 
caused) would have 
serious socio-economic 
consequences.  
The impact on the 
wild fishery is difficult 
to predict (Victorian 
experience differs from 
Tasmanian experience)
Use of effluent pond to dilute outflow.
Positioning of outlet pipes away from 
wild fishery areas
Adoption of 5 nm separation of farms/
processing facilities
Routine testing of farm animals 
(underway)
Comprehensive Biosecurity Plan and 
trained staff
Compulsory shut down of water supply 
on detection (as in Tasmania, but 
not practiced in the original Victorian 
outbreak)




6 Failure to detect ABHV-1 
when it may be present
Regular compliance visits, inspecting 
farm records
Independent sampling and audit
Comprehensive Biosecurity Plan and 
trained staff
Routine testing of selected animals 
from the farm




9 The PCR test is very 
sensitive, but the 
continued finding of 
strains in Tasmania is 
problematic. A paper on 
sample sizes used in 
testing was written for the 
pearling industry in 1998 
(attached).
The ABHV-1 gene has 
been sequenced by 
AAHL and SARDI, and 
the sequence will be 
used by them to develop 
new tests based on 
conservative genes.
Use the 99% confidence level when 
setting sample sizes for translocation. 
This was agreed by the Department in 
1999.
Maintain close linkages with the OIE 
reference laboratory on AVG (AAHL 
Geelong) to ensure latest tests are 
used.
Use histology as well as qPCR for 
routine health testing
